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RECENT CASES
have been adopted upon the theory that prosecutions should not
be allowed to ferment endlessly in files of the government to ex-
plode only after witnesses and proofs necessary to the protection
of the accused have by sheer lapse of time passed, beyond avail-
ability.12
The decision in the instant case rests upon the interpretation of a
criminal statute, and the rules of statutory construction should-be
followed. The New Jersey Supreme Court has come to a conclusion
that is contra to the weight of authority and the better legal reason-
ing. The better view is that statutes of limitations in criminal cases
must be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, 3 and against
the state.14 Had the legislature intended to exclude second degree
murder from the statute of limitations they would have so provided.
The court was not justified in implying the legislature's intent.
RICHARD A. RAHLFS.
EVIDENCE - ADMISSIONS AGAINST INTEREST - IMPLICATING CON-
FESSION OF ONE CO-CONSPRIATOR IN A JOINT TRIAL. - The United
States District Court in a joint trial convicted petitioner and four
co-defendants of violating a federal statute by conspiring to deal
unlawfully in alcohol.1 At the close of the prosecution's case the
trial court admitted the confession of a co-defendant, made after
the termination of the alleged conspiracy and without deleting ref-
erences to the petitioner.2 The jury was instructed to consider the
confession only in determining the guilt of the confessor. The peti-
tioner did not request a separate trial but moved to exclude the co-
defendant's confession contending it was prejudicial error against
him. The United States Supreme Court, four Justices dissenting,
held that a restricted admission of a post conspiracy confession by
one co-conspirator which implicated petitioner did not constitute
reversible error. Paoli v. United States, 77 S.Ct. 294 (1957).
The decision in the instant case is supported by the weight of
Alliance of Theater State Employees and Moving Picture Mach. Operators of U. S. and
Canada, 55 Cal. App.2d 357, 130 P.2d 788 (1942).
12. United States v. Eliopoulos, 45 F. Supp. 777 (D. N.J. 1942).
13. State v. Colvin, 284 Mo. 195, 223 S.W. 585 (1920); Jacox v. State, 154 Neb.
416, 48 N.W.2d 390 (1951); State v. Patriarca, 71 R. I. 151, 43 A.2d 54 (1945).
14. State v. Brenner, 132 N.J.L. 607, 41 A.2d 532 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945); State
v. Patriarca, 71 R.I. 151, 43 A.2d 54 (1945).
1. 62 Stat. 701 (1948), 18 U.S.C. 1 371 (1952).
2. Once the conspiracy is over the acts or confessions of a conspirator are ad-
missable only against the confessor and are inadmissable hearsay as to the other de-
fendants. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440 (1949); Fiswick v. United States,
329 U. S. 211 (1946); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1891).
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authority in Federal Courts in holding that the prejudicial effect of
a co-defendant's confession can be cured by proper instructions.3
In the absence of a motion for a separate trial,4 there seems to be
no practical way of reaching a just result without admitting the
confession. The injury to the defendant is outweighed by the add-
ed difficulties of enforcement if the confession is left out entirely.5
Thus while the courts have often recognized the possibility of pre-
judice in such cases," they have adhered to the basic premise of our
jury system, namely, the ability of the jury to follow instructions
and correctly separate, weigh, and determine the credibility of the
facts.7
The dissenting Justices in the principal case question the fairness
of the holding and point out that admitting a co-conspirator's con-
fession into evidence, despite instructions to the jury, does not
achieve the desired results and that too often such implicating state-
ments cannot be wiped from the minds of the jurors.8 This view is
supported by an increasing number of legal writers and judges.
The dissenters feel that when a conspirator's statement is so damn-
ing to another against whom it is inadmissable, the trial court's
discretion in granting a separate trial should not be binding upon
the appellate court.10 They suggest that the trial judge must either
refuse to admit the statement or, sever the trial of the other defend-
ants.' Several states have tried to remedy this situation by relaxing
3. See, e.g., Cwach v. United States, 212 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1954).
4. Such a motion would probably be denied anyway. See Hall v. United States,
168 F.2d 161, 163 (D. C. Cir. 1948) ("The mere fact that admissions made by one
defendant which are not evidence against others is not conclusive grounds for ordering
parties to be tried separately."); United States v. Glasser, 116 F.2d 690, 701 (7th Cir.
1940) (No separate trial will be granted merely because an unfavorable atmosphere
might be created by the presence on the trial of codefendant.).
5. See People v. Buckminster, 274 Ill. 435, 113 N.E. 713 (1916) (dictum).
6. See Krulewitch v. United States;' 336 U. S. 440 (1949); Blumenthal v, United
States, 332 U. S. 539 (1947); United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360 (2nd Cir. 1948)
(Certiorari denied 68 S. Ct. 738 [19481).
7. Opper v. United States, 348 U. S. 84, 95 (1954) ("To say that the jury might
have been confused amounts to nothing more than unfounded speculation that the jurors
disregarded clear instructions of the court in arriving at their verdict.").
8. United States v. Paoli, 77 S.Ct. 294, 304 (1957) (dissent).
9. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440, 453 (1949) ("The naive as-
sumption .that prejudicial evidence can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all
practicing lawyers know io be unmitigated fiction. See Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R.
Co., 167 F.2d 54 [2nd Cir.]"); Hale v. United States, 25 F.2d 430, 438 (5th Cir. 1928)
[lit is inconcievable that the impression made upon the minds of the jurors
could have been removed by the formal remarks of the court."); Lutwak v. United States,
3.44 U.S. '604, 623 (1922) ("But one of the additional leverages obtained by the
prosecution through proceeding as for conspiracy . . . is that it may get into evidence
against one defendaht acts or omissions. which color the case against all."); Osborn, The
Mind of the Juror (1937).
10. See United States v. Paoli, 77 S. Ct. 294, 303 (1957) (dissent). That the trial
court's discretion is binding, see Krause v, United States, 147 Fed. 442 (8th Cir. 1926);
North Dakota v. Whitman, 79 N.W.2d 528 (N. D. 1956).
11. United States v. Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 324 (2nd. Cir. 1956) (dissent). It would
seem that a contrary result would merely substitute the appellate court's discretion in
place of the trial court's. See also Rex. v. Martin, 9 Ont. L. Rep. 218, 4 Ann, Cases 912
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(1905) which suggests the prosecution must say if it intends to use the confession so the
prisoners can be tried separately.
the requirements for the granting of a separate trial.12 When one
considers that the courts do not assume all errors are prejudicial,
but regard the whole record in determining the substantial correct-
ness of the decision,13 the majority opinion reaches a just result in
admitting the confession and taking the chance of possible pre-
judice toward the defendant. In fact, the admission seems to
further the search for truth."
WILLIAM F. LINDELL.
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - REMOVAL OF ACTIONS -
FAILURE TO FILE COPIES OF REMOVAL PETITION IN STATE COURT.-
Plaintiff commenced action in state court by service of summons.'
Defendant filed a removal petition and bond in Federal Court, gave
notice to the plaintiff and brought copies of the removal petition
to the state court where they 'were not filed because plaintiff had
not yet filed her action.2 Defendant impleaded third-party defend-
ant who after expiration of the time for removal moved to quash
the third-party complaint and to remand the action to the state
court on the ground that the removal statute 3 was not complied
12. Suarez v. State, 95 Fla. 42, 115 So. 519 (1928); People v. Feolo, 282 N.Y.
276, 26 N.E.2d 256 (1940); Flamme v. State, 171 Wis. 501, 177 N.W. 596 (1920);
1 Burn's Indiana Ann. St. § 2300 (1926) ("... .. [A]ny defendant requiring it, before
the jury is sworn must be tried separately. See also People v. Buckminster, 274 Ill. 436,
113 N.E. 713 (1916) (Which held that the admission of the part of the codefendant's
confession which implicated defendant was error despite instruction to the jury to dis-
regard the implications.).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 391 (1946); See Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619
(1952) ("A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one.").
14. As Judge Learned Hand stated the problem, "In effect, however, the rule prob-
ably furthers, rather than impedes, the search for truth, and this perhaps excuses the
device which satisfies form while it violates substance." Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d
1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932).
1. See N. -D. Rev. Code § 28-0501 (1943) "Civil actions in the courts of this
state shall be commenced by service of a summons."; see also Coman v. Williams, 78 N.
D. 560, 50 N.W.2d 494, 498 (1952) (dictum) (the court obtains jurisdiction at service
of the summons). The state; court must have jurisdiction before *the federal court can
acquire jurisdiction on removal. See Weeks v. The Fidelity and Casualty Company of
N. Y., 218 F.2d 503, (5th Cir. 1955).
2. See N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0511 (1943) (requiring the summons and the
several pleadings in a civil action to be filed with the court within ten days after service
thereof); see also Crum, Proposed North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, 32 N. Dak L.
Rev. 88, 98-99 (1956) (that the state court may have jurisdiction of the action without
a record of the case); see also Schaff v. Kennelly, 61 N.W.2d 538, 543 (N. D. 1953)
(dictum) ("... filing is not a condition precedent to the acquisition of jurisdiction .. .").
3. 62 Stat. 939 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C. A. § 1446 (1949) ("Procedure
for Removal, (a) File verified petition in federal court, (b) within 20 days of com-
mencement of action in state court, (c) post bond in Federal court and (d) 'promptly
after the filing of such petition and bond the defendant or' defendants shall give written
notice thereof to all adverse parties 'and shall file a copy of the -petition with the clerk of
such State Court, which shall effect the removal and the State Court shall 'proceed "no..
further unless and until the case is remanded.") Formerly, removal was initiated'by filing
the petition in state court, and copies of the petition in Federal Cotirt. See 36 Stat. 1095(1911), 28 U.S.C. § 72 (1946). See also Rule 81, Fed. Rules of Civ. Proc., making
